Such was the tension in the Rift Valley as the referendum neared that a drunken brawl in a shebeen in Nandi District between a Nandi man and his Kisii friend swiftly formed the core of a rumour that evictions of non-Kalenjin had already started.
Similar tales stirred up tension during the campaign. In Cherangany, for instance, anti-'immigrant' eviction leaflets were discovered; local politicians were blamed. However, the locals turned against one politician and forced him to move. As the media played up local fears, some displaced people returned to the camps - some genuinely out of fear although others were said to be trying to cash in on the local 'victim' industry.
The state of nerves in the Rift Valley was such that the police were not taking any chances this time around. Accused of being complicit in the post-election violence of 2007, police deployed about 100,000 officers across the country, according to Deputy Police Spokesperson Charles Owino. Of those, 15,000 were deployed to the volatile Rift Valley. In 2007, police were unable to protect the innocent. Police stations were themselves ethnically and politically polarised: As the Orange Democratic Movement challenged the Party of National Unity, the greeting at Eldoret Police station, for instance, was, 'This is an ODM zone. Welcome.'
Police have not attempted to restore confidence among the locals, either. Soon after signing the National Accord in February 2008, the government strategy used security forces, mainly regular police and the Administration Police, as barriers between the Kalenjin and the displaced people. Police stations sprung up everywhere. The government's reconciliation strategy did not go much further. This 'securitisation' mushroomed in the run-up to the referendum.
Molo member of parliament Joseph Kiuna's recent slip during a public rally that 'this time around, the Kikuyu were ready' indicated that beneath the fragile peace, the talk of communities rearming was a reality. This triggered a fear of mutual annihilation. What some are calling the 'Ocampo factor' (a reference to International Criminal Court Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo) has played some part in preventing organised violence; politicians both high and low who are already implicated are wary of being associated with further violence.
Everyone expected the Rift Valley to reject a draft constitution accepted elsewhere. Both William Ruto and ex-President Daniel arap Moi whipped up local support for the No vote. Coupled with the lack of an effective civic education programme (thanks in part to the reluctance of Uhuru Kenyatta's Treasury to release money until very late), rumours and propaganda have filled the information vacuum. Locals were told that a Yes vote would be a vote for Raila Odinga in 2012, an idea they shunned.
Moi and Ruto capitalised on this ignorance and, from a shifting platform that played up Kalenjin fears about land confiscation by central government and a Kenyan distaste for 'foreign' values (in this case abortion and gay marriage), they built up a considerable head of steam.
Many observe, however, that Ruto distanced himself from some key allies since campaigning began. Surrounding himself with yes-men, he convinced his ethnic constituents to vote with him only by sheer will and personal popularity. However, the fact that a veteran politician, Industrialisation Minister and ODM Chairman Henry Kosgey, managed to bring four of his Kalenjin cabinet colleagues into the Yes camp (see Feature) suggested a body of support for the Yes camp among Kalenjin electors. Among the Kalenjin elite, there is concern that Ruto's Lone Ranger mission will lock the Kalenjin out of the political mainstream. Many may turn against him as Kalenjin leader. After the results were announced, Ruto conceded defeat but quickly struck an aggressive stance, insisting consultations would be necessary to resolve stickier constitutional issues ahead.
It is the long-term implications of the new constitution that worry Moi and many of his old coterie, for instance, that devolution means dismantling the Rift Valley as an administrative unit. Its boundaries were set during the August 1963 Boundaries Commission exercise, Kenya's first referendum, organised in anticipation of the Independence majimboist (federal) constitution. At the time, the Kalenjin, Maasai and others said they wanted to be administered in one region. Wary of Kikuyu and other 'big tribe' domination, the Rift has served as a homeland to these Nilotic groups, with Moi ruling the roost over the last half century. More worrying for them is that under the new constitution, counties - the new administrative units - will create ethnic homelands, allowing migrant communities, of Kikuyu in particular, to legitimise their settlement in the Rift Valley.
In fact, Moi's old acolyte Ruto was inadvertently behind the trouble. He refused to back his ODM party's position at April's Naivasha constitutional talks and the devolution clauses are largely the result of his deal with Uhuru Kenyatta.
